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The individual exposed to " humanis tic" and 
"behavioristic" literature throughout his university 
schooling, whether in psychology or education, may after 
each successive exposure to one particu lar school reflect, 
" I agree with that." The inconsistency o f find ing ground 
for agreement in two supposedly different schools of 
thought concerning the nature of what Is meaningful In 
the examination and understanding of man, eventually 
will, or should, create a tension that needs to be resolved. 
The debate as rivat techniques 
At present when the referents "behaviorism" and 
"humanism" come up in discussion they are usually In the 
form of the adjectives: " behavioristic" and " humanistic." 
In other words, the bulk of the literature we read is not so 
much concerned with the theory or philosophical bases of 
these two schools of thought but rather the techniques 
which claim to be derived from them. Our concentration is 
on technique. For behaviorists the d iscussion might cen· 
ter around the merits of programmed instruction, using 
a machine versus the use o f books and teachers, or the 
most appropriate techniques for classroom management. 
In the humanist camp, partic ularly in the area of Individual 
development, the discussion might center around the 
relative merits of the " sensitivity train ing" or the "en· 
counter" approach, vs. the "T·Group" approach. These 
group counseling techniques are usually the method of In· 
tervention preferred by humanist counselors. 
With this focus on technique the issue as to who has 
the most effective technology is raised. Educators and 
psychologists of the behavioral persuasion usually fee l 
that they have an advantage here. Because they are con· 
tent to focus on, and attempt to measure only behavior, 
they can offer fai rly conclusive evidence for the el· 
!activeness of their work. (eg. The client' s fetishistic reac· 
tion either persisted or it didn' t.) Behavioris ts like to point 
to the dearth of convincing studies pointing to ef· 
fectiveness of group growth experiences, the main tool of 
the humanists. Campbell and Dunnell (1968) and Smith 
(1975) have published in the Psychological Bulletin two of 
the most comprehensive and rigorous reviews. To grossly 
paraphrase: Campbell and Ounnett find some changes In 
behavior, but virtually no evidence which Is satisfactory to 
them, regard ing the effectiveness of T-group experiences 
on managerial personnel relative to their organizational 
roles; Smith reviewed studies on the outcome of sen-
sitivity training and after culling out numerous studies 
which didn't obtain measures from controls, which didn"t 
use a repeated measures design, and which didn't satisfy 
a minimal time duration, was able to find a group of 100 
powerful studies, only seventy-eight of which detected 
significant predicted changes in behavior. 
Behaviorists would argue that in view of this literature 
one has to work rather hard to find convincing evidence 
for the effectiveness of humanistlcally orientated 
techniques. ls this a problem to the humanist? 
No! At this point the humanist returns to the 
definit ion of his field. Humanists right from the beginning 
had, almost in anticipation, set up a defense. This defense 
might be called "engulf and devour" eclecticism. The 
basis of this strategy is contained In any definition of 
humanist psychology one might like to review. Here Is 
that provided by Cohen in Hans Eyslnck's Encyclopedia of 
Psychology, 1972. 
"It" (humanistic psychology) " does not deny 
the validity o f any psychological work with sound 
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credentials, in theory and method. It insists, 
hOwever (and this is its distinctive feature), that a 
comprehensive psychology of man cannot be 
delimited by particular methods (experimental or 
s tatistical), any more than a cartographer can omit 
oceans or mountain ranges merely because he can· 
not traverse the former or scale the latter." 
This definition by its breadth actually allows the in· 
clusion of behaviorism:" ... does not deny the validity of 
any psyohOlogical work with sound credentials." 
Humanists seeming ly are not denying the validity of 
focusing on overt behavior as a basis of analysis for 
predicting future behavior but they are implying that there 
is more to human behavior than this element alone. 
The debate as phllosphical differences 
Where then do the differences lie, as there are in fact 
differences. and what led to this rather messy state of af· 
fairs? Interestingly, the fundamental distinction between 
behaviorism and humanism is philosophical and Is 
revealed when one examines the problem of knowledge: 
(i.e. what is knowledge?). 
" Empiricism" and " rationalism" are two major OP· 
posing positions in the argument concern ing the relation· 
ship botween experience and the organ ization of the 
mind. Hilgard and Bower (1975) makes the distinction very 
nicely. To paraphrase: The British Empiricists in llne with 
the positivism of Comte developed a doctrine that 
knowledge was derived through sensory experience. Com· 
plex ideas were constructed of simpler ideas and these In 
turn cou ld further be reduced. They believed that the mind 
was like a machine built ou t of simple components each in 
an additive relationship to the next. They also believed 
that ideas were connected through the action of 
association or contiguity in experience. 
In contrast the European rationalists, Descantes, 
Leibniz and Kant argued that reason alone rather than 
sense data. spiritual revelation or any other source was 
the basis of knowl edge. They also argued that certain 
types of knowledge were a priori. 
Empi ricism was very powerful in the history of the 
rebellion of psychology against philosophy. In this 
rebellion empirical research attempted to render obsolete 
any speculations about the nature of the universe. This 
tradition starts with Ebbinghaus and Thorndyke, In the 
188-0's and 90's and has continued in the 20th Century with 
Pavlov, Watson and Skinner. Meditations and In· 
tro
spectlons 
on the nature of the soul, the psyche, the 
mind and so on were replaced by observations and ex· 
perimen ts concerning the behavior of living organisms, In· 
eluding human beings. Without this work, psychology, un· 
der the influence of such as Titchener, could have 
remained the asylum for philosophical meditation forever. 
It Is c lear that the empiricist tradition gave impetus to 
this development. Empiricism's notions, particularly that 
of association Ism, are fundamental to the concepts of the 
"law of effect" , Guthrie's contiguity theory of learning and 
classical and operant conditioning. However, rationalism 
has received considerable support for the notions of a 
priori knowledge from psychologists working on per· 
ceptual development and depth perception (Hllgard and 
Bower, t975, p. 8). Associationism is also an inadequate 
principle to use when explaining the " well·formedness" o f 
most speech In-puts and out-puts. Associationlsm allows 
for no mechanism by which the individual can sort out a 
" word salad" from a meaningful sentence. 
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The debate as It is now presented is essentially be· 
tween behaviorally orientated and cognitively and per· 
ceptually orientated psychologists who_ both utilize the 
empirical approach to knowledge embodied In _the _p_res~nt 
day hypothetlco-deductive model of sc1ent1f1c . on· 
vestigation. Given their di fferences In ph1losoph1cat 
origin, it is understandable that professional quar~els OC· 
cur as to the adequacy of their respective explanatoons for 
behavior. Humanist psychologists, however, aren't 
usually associated with cognitive or _Perc.epti?n research, 
so having rejected the commonly 1mpl1 ed 1nclus1on of 
behaviorism by humanism and poin ted to the 
phi losophical gap between behaviorism and one of the 
derivatives of rationalism, cognitive psychology, where 
does this leave us in our examination of the differences 
between behaviorism and humanism? 
Humanist psychology and ideology 
A closer look at the literature of humanistic 
psychology seems to indicate that the substantive di!· 
ference is actually political. 
Charles Hampden-Turner's boOk Radical Man (1970) 
is probably the best researched and documented presen-
tation of the contemporary humanistic position. In Radical 
Man Hampden-Turner develops three themes: a critique of 
current social scientific philosophy and the research 1t 
generates, his own model of man, and the application of 
that model in the analysis of contemporary social set· 
tings. The empiricism and pos!tlvlsm which _is so ex· 
trovertedly displayed by behaviorists such as Skinner, and 
the structural-functionali sm found in the sociology of 
Talcott Parsons and Radcllff ·Brown is seen by Hampden· 
Turner as essentially conservative In lu_nction .. Man is· 
examined as he is and the causes for hos cond ition d1-
sected. By studying man in this fashion a sanctification of 
the status quo takes place, which is only a shOrt step_ from 
saying "this is the way ii will be" or " this 1s the way 1t has 
to be". Thus for Hampden-Turner the image of man im· 
plicit in the practice of science is that of an atomized, 
depersonalized, determined man. 
Hampden-Turner's work was a product of the sixties. 
The sixties were a well-spring for humanism and typically 
Hampden-Turner provides us with an al te'!'ative _image of 
man: A man with a " synthesizing capacity which turns 
brain input into novel output, a man with a symbolizing 
and exploring capacity, and a man who engages '". a 
model of pscyho-social development such that thro~gh in· 
vestment of his own "authenticity" and through risking 
himself he achieves higher "synergy." . 
Unfortunately for Hampden-Turner he uses as evi-
dence for his model o f man the effectiveness of T-Group 
training, an effectiveness we have. already _seen is 
somewhat doubtful. This tends to add little veracity to the 
model. Also while the practice of social science in· 
vcstigation does often produce a rather dismal pi_cture as 
humanists like Hampden-Turner point out, this is by no 
means a result of the epistemology on which it is based. 
Indeed this argument is a basic weak~ess o f the humanist 
position. A behaviorally oriented social scientist can ha~e 
a utopian goal for man, even II Walden II Is not everyone s 
idea of utopia. 
The organism and behaviorism 
We have observed that cognitive and perceptual 
psychOlogy are the natural heirs to . rationalism while 
humanist psychology is a s tep child as 11 Is m~>r~ of a pol1t· 
lcal doctrine rather than a psychological d1sc 1phne. It now 
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seems only fair to see If behaviori sm also has feet of clay. 
II does. The problem is not philosophica l, rather it con-
cerns assumptions about the subject being studied. 
Herrnstein (1977) argues thal Sklnnerlan behaviorism, 
in its efforts to demonstrate the control o f its techn ology 
over behavior, made a number of assumptions wh ich 
down.played the role o f the organism. An Implicit assump-
tion was that of equlpotentlallty, that any response and 
reinforcer and any conditioned stimulus and un-
conditioned stimulus can be associated equally well. 
Seligman (1970) suggests degree o f " preparedness" as an 
alternative concept because some responses are simp ly 
more " natural" to the animal than others. For example, 
pigeons more readily peck for food relnforcers than peck 
for shock avoidance. 
Ski nner makes a great deal out of the notion that the 
taught responses of this animal are " arbitrary." They are 
not necessari ly natural to the animal and the reinforcer is 
not linked directly to the response. That is, the animal 
might lever-press for totally different reinforcement con-
sequences- food, drink, escape, etc. However, Skin-
nerian psychologists have to specify both the range of 
dimensions of the stim ulus and the response. As it turns 
out, they do this in terms of "natural lines of fractur e." 
These natur al l ines of fracture depend on the physical 
measures of the stimulus and response, the con-
tingencies of reinforcement (how much change In 
stimulus will produce the response and at what point 
changes In the response mode wi ll constitute a change in 
the response), and the characteris tics o f the organism ii· 
sell. Commercial animal trainers Breland and Breland 
(1961) were among the first to point out the contamination 
of response classes by their relnforcers. Racoons. in· 
dulged in washing behavior with coins they had to collect 
for rei nforcement and pigs rooted with the coins under a 
similar contingency. These organisms clearly have 
pred ispositions to certain behavi oral routines. This 
challenges the notion of equlp otenti allt y and in terms of 
this evidence the consideration o f natur al lines of fracture 
in a response is in itself a contradiction o f the notion of ar. 
bitrariness. 
Closely tied to the above argument is the Skinnerian 
no tion of drive. For him drive might be defi ned as a par-
ticular ctass of classes of behavior. The covariation in 
these classes and their relnforcers makes the concept 
necessary even for Skinner. These drives are commonly 
referred to as hunger, thirst , sex, etc. and behaviorists 
usually assume that they are few in number. As a con· 
sequence, they are argued to have salience in a very wide 
range of si tuations. The excessive concern with these few 
primary drives has diverted attention from the reinforcing 
nature of a behavior performed without an external rein-
forcer. II is interesting to note that sexual gratif ication is 
in essence not the presence of the partner but the ex· 
perience of internal gratification, a consequence o f sexuat 
behaviors. The reinforcer is behavior, not an object. 
If a response is self-reinforcing then it can't also be 
arbit rary. Herrnestein (1977) urges that academic 
psychologist studying animal behavior must look more to 
ethology if they wish to have a greater understanding of 
behavior's intrinsic power to reinforce. 
Every school pupil has been told that speech and 
language are what make our species unique. It is in-
teresting that It is in thi s specific behavior that Skinner's 
operant model experiences Its greatest problems of 
prediction and has had its plauslblllty come into most 
WINTER, 1978 
doubt when compared with more trad itional nativlst or 
organism oriented views (Chomsky, 1959, Lenneburg, 
1969). 
Enter the counselor 
This state of affairs leaves the counse lor in an ex-
ci ting position. If he desires he can freely adopt the 
ideology of humanism and the techniques and methods of 
analysis derived from bo th cognitive personality theories 
and behaviorism. Indeed Lazarus (1977) argues that even 
among " behavior therapists" "only a few die-hards would 
not agree that the stimulus-res ponse 'learning theory' 
basis of behavior therapy is passe and that a distinctly 
cognitive orientation now prevails." 
The reat world of human suffering has forced 
clinicians together at a time when theorists are prepared 
to acknowledge the deficiencies in their respective 
analyses. 
Mahoney (1977) observes that in the 1960's the "In-
sight-or iented" therapists were frustrated because they 
couldn't induce change and the behavior therapists were 
frustrated because of the restric tiveness of their theory 
and technology. 
The new hybrid Is the cognitive or soclal·learnlng 
trend now developing in psychotherapy. Its origins are In 
the thought management programs of Carneg ie (194'3 ) and 
Peal (1 960). Later Rotter (1954), Kelly (1955) and Bandura 
(1961, 1973) produced academic publications. In-
terestingly, Eiiis's (1962, 1975) rational·emotiv e therapy 
gained popular support before it achieved any 
professional respectability . 
In therapy there are three primary objectives: 1) per-
ceptual sk il ls, 2) performance skill s and 3) associative 
skills. The client is taught to examine his environment and 
lo analyze his thoughts and emotions about It. He Is also 
taught to evaluate his associations; that Is, his ex· 
pectancies and perceived contingencies, and he Is taught 
the relationship between his cognitions and his per· 
formance and emotions. Goals are set and behaviors and 
outcomes noted and monitered by the therapist. 
The counselor Is presently freed from having to label 
himself, and what has been al times something o f a 
tiresome debate has been largely resolved, lea vlng him 
free to pursue the broadest and most effective approach 
with his clien t. 
Summary 
To the extent that humanist and cognitive 
psychologies share the same philosophical base they can 
be reconciled with behaviorism in social learning theory. 
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Growth of Knowledge 
. ;
16 
The growth of knowledge might be l ikened to an expanding 
balloon, with the volume of ai r inside the balloon representing the 
known and the skin of the balloon marking the boundary between the 
known and the unknown. As the volume of the known increases, so 
does the surface area of the balloon-the extent of the boundary be· 
tween the known and unknown-so that the more we see, the more 
we see there is to see. 
John Gribbin in 
White Holes, Cosmic Gushers 
In the Universe p. 4. 
Delacorte Press, 1977 . 
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